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The Utility of the ALI I lJNIDROIT Project on Principles 
and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure 
 
Janet Walker
* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Harmonization projects abound. Globalization has fostered a keen interest in 
finding common ground on many legal and economic fronts. And so it might seem 
perfectly natural that the American Law Institute and UNIDROIT would undertake 
the project of developing internationally acceptable procedural rules for 
transnational civil and commercial litigation. However, despite the growing 
commentary, both critical and supportive, of the progress of this enormously 
challenging project, and of the particular rules under consideration, not much has 
been said about the utility of the project. 
This article steps back from the process of developing principles and rules 
to consider the utility of the project in light of the changing needs of modern 
commerce and of other related harmonization projects. It argues that the traditional 
approach to revitalizing national courts as a means of dispute resolution for 
individuals and small businesses, that of regulating jurisdiction, is fundamentally 
flawed, and that the success of the more promising long-term approach of 
promoting forum neutrality will ultimately depend on the harmonization of 
procedural rules. By contributing to the discussion of the utility of the project in 
this way, it is hoped that the importance of the project will be clearer for those 
who might contribute to its progress, and that possible future directions for the 
project might also become clearer. 
                                                          
*
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A.   The return to national courts 
The global expansion of sophisticated multinational businesses is well underway. 
Western-style fast food is available within sight of the Great Wall of China and 
exotic goods from the East are available in small-town America; young 
professionals routinely take up positions in satellite offices of local firms in 
distant countries; and people all around the world seem to be in constant contact 
by e-mail. 
As remarkable as the global expansion of sophisticated multinational 
businesses may seem, it is now being complemented, indeed rivalled, by a 
potentially far more significant kind of expansion that involving individuals and 
small businesses. Through e-commerce and generally improved communication, 
the uhorizontal" expansion of the economy involving large multinational firms is 
now being supplemented by a "vertical" expansion that will include a fuller range 
of participants in the global economy.1 
Critical to the success of any economy is an effective means of dispute 
resolution. The international commercial arbitration movement has been a 
mainstay of support for the first phase of horizontal global expansion that of 
sophisticated multinational businesses. However, the expense involved in 
privately financed dispute resolution is bound to keep this means of dispute 
resolution largely beyond the reach of those involved in this second phase.of 
global expansion that involving individuals and small businesses. To support the 
vertical integration of the global economy it will be necessary to revitalize national 
courts. 
National courts may never be able to provide the parties with the same degree 
of flexibility and confidentiality as arbitral tribunals. However, features such as 
flexibility and confidentiality may not be as important to the dispute resolution 
needs of individuals and small businesses as they have been, and will continue 
to be, to the needs of large businesses. As with so many other things in the law and 
elsewhere, the costs and benefits of customized vs. standardized arrangements 
tend to make arbitration and litigation each more suitable for a different set of 
circumstances. For individuals and small businesses, the State sponsorship and 
State regulation of national courts may ultimately make litigation a more affordable, 
accessible and reliable means of dispute resolution than international commercial 
arbitration.2 
 
B.  The key drawbacks of litigation 
While litigation may hold the promise of becoming a more suitable means of 
dispute resolution for individuals and small businesses, it has at least two major 
drawbacks. First, unlike arbitral awards, which, pursuant to the New York 
Convention, are enforceable in many countries, the judgments of national courts are 
considerably less capable of international enforcement. Second, unlike international 
commercial arbitration, which affords the parties the opportunity to establish a 
neutral and mutually acceptable forum for their disputes, the differences between 
national laws can compromise the neutrality of the dispute resolution process, and 
this can enable parties to make outcome-determin tive choices of fora. The role of 
national courts in the new global economy may depend upon the extent to which 
the impact of these two drawbacks can be reduced or eliminated. 
 
C. International enforcement of judgments 
Efforts have been made to address the first of these drawbacks the limited 
international recognition and enforcement of judgments through the negotiation of a 
multilateral judgments Convention under the auspices of the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law. The project was begun in response to a request 
by the United States in 1992, but after many preliminary reports, a proposed text 
and then a revised text, and numerous sessions of negotiations, plenary and 
 otherwise, the future of the project now seems uncertain) A proposal has been 
made to narrow the scope of the project to judgments in business.-to-business 
disputes issued by courts chosen by the parties. This proposal may save the 
project by providing a small area of consensus from which to move forward in 
future negotiations. 
Regardless of whether or how that project moves forward, the important 
point to note is the exter:it to which its success could depend upon addressing 
the second of the key drawbacks of transnational dispute resolution through 
litigation that was identified above: namely, that differences in national laws can 
compromise the neutrality of the dispute resolution process and that this can 
enable parties to make outcome-determinative choices of fora. The ability to 
manipulate the outcome of dispute resolution through the choice of forum 
impairs the likelihood that it will be considered fair to give international effect to 
the resulting judgment. 
 
D.  Forum neutrality 
The basic principle underlying judgments enforcement in the vast majority of 
legal systems is the idea that it is fair to treat the parties as precluded from re-
litigating the merits of a dispute that have already been determined by a court 
of competent jurisdiction. To the extent that one party can make an outcome-
determinative choice of forum and thereby control the outcome of the litigation, it 
is less obvious why it is fair to treat the other party as bound by the result and 
precluded from re-litigating the merits of the dispute in a different forum to seek a 
different result. 
There are two basic approaches to securing the conditions under which it is 
fair to treat the parties as bound by the result of .the litigation and precluded 
from re-litigating the merits of their dispute. The first approach regulating 
jurisdiction seeks to establish rules for determining which court should decide 
the matter; and then to treat the parties as bound by the result reached by that 
court regardless of whether a different result might be reached by a different 
court. The second approach 
securing decisional harmony seeks to establish conditions under which it would 
be reasonably expected that any court deciding the case would reach the same 
result; and then it would be fair to treat the parties as bound by the result reached 
regardless of which court heard the matter. 
 
II. REGULATI NG J URISDICTION 
 
Historically, the most common approach to securing the conditions for the 
cross-border enforcement of judgments has been to regulate jurisdiction. Thus, 
under the prevailing rules for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments, a 
judgment is generally enforceable where it has been issued by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, that is, a court whose competence is internationally 
recognized. This is sometimes described as a court with "jurisdiction in the 
international sense". 
A. · The traditional rules 
Under the traditional standards, courts have been regarded as having jurisdiction 
in the international· sense where they are either the agreed forum, or the 
defendant's home forum. The jurisdiction of the agreed forum is supported by the 
estoppel principle. Since the plaintiff has chosen the forum, the plaintiff cannot 
later complain of the result reached in that forum. Nor can the defendant resile 
from the choice of forum where the defendant has agreed in advance to the 
particular forum, or where the defendant accepts the plaintiff's choice at the time 
of the litigation by appearing and defending on the merits. 
The estoppel principle also supports the second of these bases of jurisdiction 
 the defendant's home forum. Again, since the plaintiff has chosen the forum, 
the plaintiff cannot later complain of the result reached in that forum. However, 
the estoppel principle also applies to defendants, who it is fair to regard as bound 
by the result reached in their home forum because they would generally be 
subject to suit there in any event; and, in local matters, they would not be in a 
position to argue that the court lacked jurisdiction. Moreover, it is thought that 
they should be subject generally to suit in at least one forum and, having chosen 
to locate themselves in a particular place, it is thought that they should not be 
permitted to object to being sued there solely because the plaintiff is located 
elsewhere. 
B.  Innovations for federal and regional systems 
While the traditional standards for internationally recognized jurisdiction have 
served the international community well, they have been found to be unduly 
restrictive of the possible fora available to litigants. For example, the traditional 
jurisdictional standards. would not include a forum in the place where the events 
giving rise to the dispute had occurred if it was not the defendant's home court 
or one which the defendant had accepted. These restrictive standards have been 
found to be particularly problematic in situations in which routine crossborder 
dealings between persons have been part of a closer integration of legal systems than 
exists on the international plane. 
For example, the founders of the United States recognized that an 
essential feature of their federal system would be the requirement that the courts of 
the several states give "full faith and credit" to the judgments of the courts of other 
states.4 It was then determined that it would be necessary to. ensure that the 
obligation to give full faith and credit was framed in a manner that was fair to 
defendants s and, accordingly, it was held that defendants would be regarded as 
bound by the judgment of the court of a state where there were "minimum· 
contacts" with the forum "to make it reasonable and just according to our 
traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice" for the court to assume 
jurisdiction over the matter.6 
Similarly, it was regarded as essential to economic integration in Europe to 
establish a regime of judgments  enforcement that included broader bases of 
jurisdiction than those prevailing in the international community.7 Accordingly, the 
member States negotiated a treaty to regulate jurisdiction, which came to be known as 
· the Brussels Convention. More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
"various constitutional and sub-constitutional arrangements and practices make 
unnecessary a 'full faith and credit' clause such as exists in other federations, such as 
the United States and Australia. The existence of these clauses, however, does indicate 
that a regime of mutual recognition of judgments across the country is inherent in a 
federation." 9 
In short, broader bases of jurisdiction than those available under the traditional 
rules have been seen as necessary features of the dispute resolution required 
for closer economic integration of the sort currently existing in federal or regional 
systems. 
C.  The limits of regulating jurisdiction 
In both the United States and Europe, it has been accepted that broader bases 
for jurisdiction can operate in some situations to compromise the fairness afforded 
to the parties. In those situations, litigants are enabled to make outcome-
determinative choices of forum.10 The resulting prejudice to the other party is 
tolerated, however, for the sake of facilitating the free flow of judgments within 
the network of legal systems. Provided that the l   legal systems involved are 
sufficiently similar for the results not often to differ dramatically, the potential for 
unfairness is considered tolerable in light of the importance to the federal or 
regional system of the crossborder enforcement of judgments.11 
Perceiving this possibility, and regarding it as unacceptable within a federal 
system that promotes flexibility in jurisdiction and generous rules for enforcing 
 judgments, the courts in Canada and Australia have responded by moving to 
harmonize choice-of-law rules so as to promote forum neutrality through 
decisional harrnony.12 But this is a different approach to the problem-one that will 
be discussed further in the next section. 
However, the point worth noting here is that regulating jurisdiction is an 
inherently flawed approach to securing the conditions under which it is fair to 
treat the parties as bound by the result of the litigation. It is inherently flawed 
because, as the promotion of flexibility in jurisdiction within federal and regional 
systems demonstrates, appropriate choices of forum are ideally driven by the 
logistics of dispute resolution and not by the kinds of connections that are 
relevant to determining which law should govern the dispute. For example, even if 
an injured consumer happened to have moved to the manufacturer's jurisdiction 
and so found it convenient to sue the manufacturer there, this would not necessarily 
mean that she should not be entitled to rely on the standards of liability and 
recovery of the place where she bought and used the product and was injured by 
it; nor would it necessarily mean that she should be able to rely on standards 
other than those of the place of purchase and injury simply because she found it 
convenient to sue elsewhere. 
Clever mechanisms for regulating jurisdiction may be developed .to restrict 
the opportunities for outcome-determinative choices of forum 13 but, for this 
reason, they will always be inexact methods of achieving this end. In the absence 
of an appellate court with plenary jurisdiction to enunciate harmonized, forum-
neutral choice-of-law rules, such as exists in Canada or Australia, and in the 
absence of a legislature with authority to prescribe such rules for the various 
legal systems involved, such flaws must be tolerated for the sake of the integration 
of the various legal systems necessary to the federal or regional arrangement. 
While the flaws inherent in this approach may be tolerated for the sake of 
the federal or regional integration of legal systems based on similar traditions, 
these flaws may be sufficient to prevent the regulation of jurisdiction from 
becoming a suitable basis for the broader international enforcement of judgments. 
This has been demonstrated by the history of the negotiations at The Hague for 
a multilateral judgments Convention. Where the participating legal systems have 
diverse legal traditions, and where the reasons for securing a regime are more 
general and diffuse than they are in a federal or regional system, it can be difficult to 
secure agreement on the acceptable bases for jurisdiction. 
Although the negotiations began with the aspiration of establishing agreement 
on a range of jurisdictional bases, it now appears that the bases of jurisdiction on 
which agreement is possible in the near future are even narrower than those 
endorsed under the traditional rules discussed earlier in this article those of the 
agreed forum and the defendant's home forum. The least controversial of all 
bases of jurisdiction the agreed forum may succeed in being adopted, but only 
for disputes between businesses. This basis of jurisdiction, and this scope of 
application for it, are arguably the least controversial of all because the resolution of 
business-to-business disputes in fora agreed to by the parties occurs in the 
context of commercial risk allocation and therefore engages relatively little public 
concern to ensure conditions of fairness among the various possible situations.
 . 
·while the negotiations at The Hague may be successful in regard to business-
tobusiness disputes in agreed fora, it does not appear that agreement will be 
reached on the jurisdiction of the defendant's home forum, in part because there 
are certain small but significant differences between the views taken on the 
contacts that should serve to indicate that a forum is the defendant's home 
forum. The obvious historical difference is that between the common law, which 
has used the defendant's physical presence as the. standard, and the civil law, 
which has used the 'defendant's domicile, but this difference has not been 
particularly contentious. Rather, the difference that has proved particularly 
 contentious has been that of general jurisdiction in matters involving corporate 
defendants, and the debate. has focused on whether business activities alone 
should suffice to found such jurisdiction.14 
 
D.  The utility of regulating jurisdiction 
There is much to be learned from the difficulties experienced in the negotiations 
at The Hague. Clearly, the second kind of global economic expansion mentioned 
earlier, that involving individuals and small businesses, provides a strong 
incentive to foster multilateral recognition of national court judgments. However, 
despite the strong desire to achieve the kind of harmonization necessary to permit 
the widespread recognition and enforcement of judgments, when this involves 
'diverse legal systems, the regulation of jurisdiction represents an indirect and 
imprecise means that does not readily meet the requirements of fairness. In the 
course of these negotiations, it has become clear that differences that might 
have appeared at first to be minor, and therefore inconsequential, may in fact 
be profound and difficult to harmonize. 
In particular, it has become clear that the highly remedial and progressive 
approach to private law that characterizes the American legal tradition is 
reflected directly in jurisdictional standards that cannot easily be reconciled with 
the approach of the majority of other legal systems whose private law traditions are 
more concerned with restorative justice and conflict resolution. Accordingly, while 
regulating jurisdiction may be a suitable foundation for a regime for the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in some federal or_ regional systems, its flaws 
make it less suitable for others, and, so far, apparently unsuitable on the broader 
international plane. 
 
Ill. SECURI NG DECISIONAL HARMONY 
 
The second basic approach to securing the conditions under which it would be fair 
to treat the parties as bound by the result of the litigation and precluded from re-
litigating the merits of their ·dispute seeks to establish forum neutrality. This 
approach promotes conditions under which it would be reasonably expected that 
any court deciding the case would reach the same result. As with matters decided 
locally, the application of the estoppel principle would seem obvious because there 
would be no systemic basis for expecting that the outcome would vary with the 
forum in which the matter is decided. Within a single legal system it is expected 
that any court would apply the same legal rules to the same facts and produce 
the same result, subject only to differences that were a matter of happenstance. 
The challenge in establishing decisional harmony is to promote conditions under 
which courts in different legal systems would likewise apply the same legal rules to 
the same facts and eliminate any reason for expecting a different result between legal 
systems. 
In general terms, decisional harmony is achieved between legal systems 
where the courts in the alternative fora could be expected to apply the same legal 
rules to the facts of the case. It would entail the harmonization of various kinds 
of legal rules: substantive legal rules, choice-of-law rules, procedural rules. 
A.  Harmonizing substantive law 
The courts in different fora will apply the same legal rules to a given case if 
the substantive law in the area is harmonized, as it is between many legal 
systems in certain areas such as the law relating to the international sale of 
goods.15 The work of harmonizing the substantive law in areas of the law that affect 
transnational dealings is essential to the advancement of international commerce 
and much is owed to institutions such as UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT for the work 
that is done in this area of harmonization. 
However, the harmonization of substantive law is not a sufficient solution on 
 its own. It must of necessity progress on a piecemeal, topic-by-topic basis and the 
results of harmonization projects must be adopted by legal systems one-by-one. 
Further, the topics that produce the most widely adopted results tend to be 
limited to those in which the localized remedial features of the law are relatively 
insignificant. Indeed, it seems increasingly clear that the harmonization of 
substantive law is appropriate for some areas of the law, and not for others. Thus, 
while this may ultimately be the most effective means of achieving forum-neutral 
dispute resolution, it seems unlikely that it would be sufficiently comprehensive in 
the foreseeable future to form the basis for the judgments of national courts to be 
granted widespread international acceptance, except, perhaps, within a fairly 
circumscribed range of disputes. 
 
8.  Harmonizing choice-of-law rules 
The courts in different fora will also apply the same legal rules, even if the 
substantive law they apply is different, if the rules for determining the applicable 
law would lead to the same result in either forum. Even if the law is different in 
Country A from that in Country B, if the choice-of-law rules in both A and B would 
require the application of the law of Country A to a particular dispute, then both 
courts would apply the same legal rules to the dispute. 
The harmonization of choice-of-law rules has been a mainstay of the work of 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law for decades; 16 and it is the 
approach to decisional harmony that has been taken in the Australian and the 
Canadian federations under the direction of their highest appellate courts. As the 
Supreme Court of Canada explained in 1994,- 
"[t]he nature of our constitutional arrangements a single country with different provinces 
exercisi'ng territorial legislative jurisdiction .:. would seem [...] to support a rule that is 
certain 
and that ensures that an act committed in one part of this country will be given the 
same legal effect throughout the country." 1 
Where the institutional conditions exist to permit the harmonization of choice of 
law, it is possible to afford considerable flexibility to litigants to resolve disputes 
in the place that is most convenient to them from a practical standpoint, and to 
maintain generous standards for the enforcement of judgments, all without 
significant concern that the outcome of particular disputes will be affected by it 
and, with it, the fairness of the dispute resolution process is compromised. 
 
C.  Harmonizing procedural law 
It would be na'lve, however, to suggest that decisional harmony could be achieved 
by harmonizing choice-of-law rules alone, even if all su.ch rules could be 
harmonized. It would be na'lve because the outcome of a dispute is often shaped 
by more than the substantive legal rules applied by the court. The procedure 
employed to resolve the dispute can have a significant impact on the way in 
which the relevant facts are established and the law is applied. And it is widely 
accepted that courts always apply their own procedural rules. Accordingly, 
procedural law may be aptly described as the last bastion of forum shopping. 
It is interesting, almost two decades later, to revisit the colourful passage by 
Lord DENNING in which he described the capacity of the United States to attract 
litigation for reasons unrelated to the efficacy or fairness of the dispute resolution 
process. His Lordship said, 
"As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only 
get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune. At no cost to himself, and at no 
risk of having to pay anything to the other side. The lawyers there will conduct the case 
'on spec' as we say, or on a 'contingency fee' as they say." 18 
Admittedly, differences in substantive law are among the factors that distort the 
process of forum selection and promote outcome-determinative choices. 
Statutory causes of actions, such as those based on regulatory laws relating to 
 racketeering, antitrust and securities may not exist elsewhere, and the effects 
that they can have on forum selection, which have been canvassed elsewhere, 19 
are beyond the scope of this article. But many of the distinctive features of civil 
litigation in the United States that attract litigants whose disputes .might more 
appropriately be determined elsewhere are procedural. These features include the 
widespread use of juries in civil trials, the availability of broader discovery, 
methods of calculating damages that lead to higher awards, and the absence of 
fee-shifting, or fee-shifting that is available only to plaintiffs. And the effect of these 
distinctive features is no less significant than it was when Lord Denning penned his 
famous passage. 
Lest it be thought that the mischief here lies solely in the promulgation of 
procedural rules that are favourable to plaintiffs, and that the problem/ therefore, 
rests overwhelmingly with litigation in the United States, it should be noted that 
disparities per se are problematic in that unfamiliar procedures can operate also as 
a disincentive to particular choices of forum. While the distortions in forum selection 
that result from distinctive procedures in the United States receive publicity because 
they have caused litigants to select fora in the United States inappropriately, 
distinctive procedures in other fora that have caused litigants to avoid litigation in 
those fora are . also problematic. Accordingly, disparities in procedural law that 
inappropriately attract litigation may give rise to contentious jurisdictional disputes 
and resistance to the enforcement of the resulting judgments, but disparities that 
inappropriately discourage a choice of forum or cause resistance to it by making 
litigation there seem likely to be unfamiliar and hence difficult are also undesirable. 
One obvious way to reduce the distortions in forum selection caused by 
disparities in procedure is for courts to take a very restrictive view of the matters 
that they characterize as procedural. This would reduce the matters to which 
they would insist on applying their own law, rather than a foreign governing 
law. In offering a critique and reformulation of the old formalistic rules for 
distinguishing matters of substance from matters of procedure, the Supreme 
Court of Canada recommended that Canadian courts take a functional and 
pragmatic approach to characterizing matters as procedural. The Supreme Court 
recommended that Canadian courts apply as much of the applicable law as they 
could in any given case and that they treat as procedural only those matters to 
which administrative efficacy required them to apply their own law. As long as 
applying the relevant foreign legal rule does not unduly impair the process of 
deciding the case, the courts should apply it.20 
As salutary an approach as this might be, though, it is a solution that 
operates only on the margins and that can never effectively address disparities in 
core features of procedure. To the extent that procedural disparities can combine 
with flexibility in forum selection to affect the quality of justice, it is unlikely that the 
international community will embrace the free-flow of judgments. Indeed, in 
establishing a "full faith and credit"-like obligation within the Canadian federation, 
similarity of procedure · across the country supported the view of the Supreme Court 
of Canada that the 
"Canadian judicial structure is so arranged that any concerns about differential 
quality of justice among the provinces can have no real foundation." 21 
This, in turn, gave the Supreme Court confidence that there was no real 
prejudice suffered by permitting any Canadian court with a real and substantial 
connection to the matter to issue a judgment binding on the defendant 
throughout Canada. Where more significant' differences in procedure exist, it 
may be more difficult and less effective simply to encourage courts to interpret the 
scope of procedural law narrowly. 
Accordingly, all the projects for harmonization and for rapprochement of 
legal systems are important to the revitalization of national courts so to enable 
them to provide an affordable, accessible and reliable forum for dispute resolution 
for individuals and small businesses in a vertically expanded global economy. 
 However, among these projects, to the extent that it can assist in overcoming the 
final hurdle to achieving decisional harmony, the harmonization of procedural 
law, may ultimately hold the key. 
 
I V. POSSIBLE FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THE PROJECT 
 
In view of the special utility of the harmonization of procedural law in promoting 
the conditions for decisional harmony, it is possible to anticipate effective 
approaches that might be taken to the considerable challenges faced by the 
ALl/UNIDROIT project. In particular, two main challenges will be addressed in this 
section: those presented by differences in approaches taken to the role of civil 
litigation in law reform (these differences are most significant between the United 
States and other legal systems), and those presented by differences in 
approaches taken to the basic responsibilities of the participants in the dispute 
resolution process (these differences are most significant between the common law 
and the civil law). 
A. Civil litigat!on and law reform 
The first of these challenges arises because the extent to which the law is 
remedial varies considerably in certain areas of the law and in certain countries. In 
these areas and in these countries, the law seeks not to restore the parties' 
former positions so much as to respond to certain social welfare concerns that are 
likely to be associated with the kind of dispute being resolved. These social 
welfare concerns tend to vary from one legal system to another because they 
arise in different social welfare contexts. Further, the 'extent to which these 
concerns ought to be addressed in the course of civil litigation itself varies from 
one legal system to another. In some legal systems, such as the United States, 
"improving the law" is regarded as a routine feature of civil litigation, while in 
others, it is regarded as rendering the law impermissibly unpredictable.22 
, One example of this arises in consumer claims, in which the complaining 
party is likely to be an individual who has been harmed by a defective product or 
an inadequate service and who seeks compensation from the manufacturer or 
supplier of that product or service. The remedial features of the law in this area 
may not be restricted to the substantive rules for determining liability or damages, 
but may extend also to the procedure by which such disputes are resolved. 
Accordingly, for example, class actions and other means of aggregating claims 
have been endorsed in some places as an appropriate procedure to resolve such 
disputes. Further examples include favourable presumptions that reduce the 
standards of proof, such as strict liability and fraud on the market, generous 
pleading rules, and the availability of broad discovery, and multiple damages 
awards intended to provide an incentive to persons to participate in market 
regulation by advancing their claims. · . 
There is some indication that the importance of securing international 
recognition and enforcement of United States judgments may warrant the forgoing 
of damages awards that are considered excessive by enforcing countries' 
standards.23 However, it is far from clear that such a concession to decisional 
harmony would extend to requiring plaintiffs to forgo the favourable elements of 
procedure noted above in matters involving connections to other places matters that 
would attract the application of foreign law to· the substantive legal issues under 
forum-neutral choiceof-law rules. 
Accordingly, there could be occasions in which conflicting commitments to 
the importance of the remedial potential of civil litigation and to the importance of 
securing legal certainty would render participant countries unwilling to harmonize 
the procedural rules that they regarded necessary to those commitments. This 
appears to have been a particularly strong source of contention in The Hague 
project to harmonize jurisdictional standards. As with that project, a promising 
response would be to reduce the proposed scope of the application of the 
 ALl/UNIDROIT project on transnational civil procedure to a range of disputes 
unlikely to engage a determined commitment to procedures that would promote 
remedial benefits at the expense of legal certainty. This would not constitute an 
admission of defeat. While the drafters of the Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods could have sought to harmonize the whole of contract law, their 
decision to focus on the international sale of goods was a fruitful one. Similarly, in 
the event of such an impasse, a narrower scope might serve to secure the 
adoption of harmonized procedural rules in a circumscribed set of cases that could 
subsequently be expanded. 
 
B. Basic responsibilities of court and counsel 
The second of these challenges is that the transitional transaction costs of adopting 
a new procedural code are potentially overwhelming. If one of the advantages of 
resolving disputes in national courts is that national courts provide the security 
of stable procedural rules familiar to counsel, then the introduction of a new 
harmonized procedural code might seem counter-productive. Indeed, if there 
existed a popular procedural code that was readily acceptable to a wide range 
of legal systems, it is likely that its use would expand steadily and there would be 
no need to pursue efforts to draft a new set of harmonized procedural rules. 
However, it does not appear that such a code exists and, accordingly, the question 
of the transitional transaction costs must be faced.24 
If the challenge cannot be avoided, it should nevertheless riot be overstated. 
The transaction costs of disparities in procedural rules are reasons for the project 
they are not a product of it. Reducing the transaction costs from the costs of having 
to deal with any one of a multitude of different procedural rules to having to deal 
with either local procedural rules or harmonized procedural rules is bound to be a 
net gain. The impetus to negotiate a multilateral judgments convention, and the 
analysis in this paper of the obstacles to its success that are the product of 
procedural diversity demonstrate that the time has passed when such transaction 
costs could be avoided by maintaining national insularity in dispute resolution. 
Further, while the triumph of the United States Federal Rules has served as 
an inspiration to this project,25 harmonization projects of this sort in Europe 26 and 
those directed at the law of judgments in the United States have not yet met with 
the same degree of success. This suggests that in some contexts it might be 
preferable not to seek to replace local standards with harmonized standards, but 
to establish a second harmonized code for crossborder matters.27 In this regard, 
although the Convention on the International Sale of Goods may have had a slow 
start in that contract drafters in either forum. Even if the law is different in Country 
A from that in Country B, if the choice-of-law 
Nevertheless, the transaction costs of. introducing a new regime may be 
virtually insurmountable where they relate to differences in procedure that 
fundamentally alter the roles of those involved in the process. At one extreme, 
synchronizing time limits for particular stages of the process may be achieved 
with very little disruption. However, at the other extreme, transferring the 
responsibility for establishing the factual record from the judge to the parties' 
counsel could necessitate such a reorientation of the basic understanding of the 
process as to require a virtual re-education of the legal profession in some legal 
systems.28 To introduce an adversarial system-based approach into a civil law 
legal system could require adjustments of varying significance to everything 
from the process of discovery to the nature of the professional obligation of 
confidence to the compellability of witnesses. But more than this, the differences 
between the systems operate at such a fundamental level of principle as to require 
a change in the instinctive approach taken by participants to their various roles and 
to their relative responsibilities to one another. 
Does this make.the harmonization project ultimately infeasible? Perhaps not. 
To the extent that the reduction in the range and complexity of the disparities in 
 procedural law is generally beneficial, it might be better to aim for a more 
achievable goal. Radical though the suggestion may seem, the establishment of 
two harmonized wocedural codes, one for each of the common law and the civil 
law, might be a goal that is both more attainableand more easily implemented. 
Such a compromise might be a disappointment to the particularly optimistic among 
the supporters of the project and to those who hoped soon to litigate in a world 
without borders, but it could serve to see the project through some serious 
obstacles. 
 
C.  The utility of the Principles 
Surprisingly, it is appropriate to have left discussion of the utility of the Principles 
to the last. That is because in the Principles lies the promise for the future of 
this harmonization project. 
Of all the lessons learned in the last decade through the various 
harmonization projects undertaken, perhaps the single most important lesson is 
that the establishment of a fixed cadre of harmonized rules to be imposed on 
national legal systems is neither the most important nor the most attainable 
goal.29 It has been an attractive goal for harmonization projects because it 
resembles the goals of domestic law reform projects and because it provides a 
clear framework for the project and the promise of a tidy sense of completion, but 
experience with this goal has been less than satisfactory. Maintaining such a 
goal introduces tensions into the process relating to the potential for failing to 
reach agreement and to the potential that the substance of any agreement 
reached will meet with serious resistance or will fail to be implemented 
uniformly. 
As a result, in some of the most ambitious and significant of projects it is 
becoming increasingly clear thatthe way forward is to conceive of the project as 
one of progressive harmonization.30 However, the special challenge of projects 
involving progressive harm'onization is to find ways to implement manageable 
portions in manageable contexts while continuing to press forward to expand the 
scope of these manageable portions and contexts. It might be possible ih the not-
too-distant future to implement one or both sets of civil law and common law 
harmonized rules· of procedure in a small number of countries for application in a 
relatively circumscribed range of cases. And once underway, the project could gain 
strength by demonstrating its utility and by undergoing further reform based on the 
experience gained through its operation. Building on this strength, it could be 
possible to increase the number of countries in which the rules were applied and 
to expand the range of cases to which they applied. Increased familiarity of 
members of the legal profession with the rules could even prompt local law 
reform initiatives to bring local procedures into line with the harmonized standards. 
But all of this is predicated on the amenability of particular legal systems to 
the introduction of the Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure. What of legal 
systems that are so diverse that they cannot readily accommodate such a set of 
procedural rules? And what of legal systems that can accommodate some but not 
all of the procedural rules? Will they be required to choose between joining the 
harmonized regime and retaining features of their procedural law that they regard 
as essential to their justice systems? Clearly, while it is hoped that the benefits of 
participating in a harmonized regime would provide a strong incentive to refrain 
from retaining divergent practices that were not essential, it is an invidious choice to 
impose on a legal system. 
The way forward in such legal systems is to provide clear formulations of 
the principles underlying the rules so that local practices can be measured against 
them. In some situations, there might exist alternative means to achieving the same 
result or promoting the same virtue. In such cases, it might be possible for a legal 
system in which it was regarded as necessary to retain a rule that had not been 
 incorporated into the harmonized regimes to justify its retention in their 
procedural law by showing how it functioned in a way that was consistent with 
the Principles. In other cases, legal systems that were wary of having their 
procedural law assimilated to that of the harmonized regime might be better able 
to appreciate the intent of the harmonized rules through the Principles and to 
consider reforms that would assist in approximating their law to that of the 
harmonized regime in a manner that was locally acceptable. 
Moreover, the benefit of the Principles would not be confined to increasing 
the number of countries in which the rules were applied they would be of value 
also to legal systems in which a harmonized regime had been adopted. The 
Principles could be used as an aid to judicial interpretation in securing an 
application of the Rules that was consistent with their objectives. Further, as 
clear statements of the underlying objectives of the Ru/es, the Principles could 
provide a reference point for reform of the Rules based on experience with the 
way in which the Ru/es operated in practice. In this way, the Principles, if stated in 
a sufficiently broad and open-textured fashion, could continue to provide leadership  
in the ongoing process of harmonizing procedural law. 
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